Charitable Bequests and Wealth at Death * Charitable bequests are a major source of income for charities but surprisingly little is known about them. The aim of this paper is to propose a multi-stage framework for analysing the bequest decision and to examine the evidence for Great Britain provided by new data on estates. The novelty of the framework is that it distinguishes between the different steps that lead to a charitable bequest. Our new data for Britain have the advantage of covering the whole population, in contrast to much of the US literature based on the small fraction of the population covered by estate tax returns. We focus on the relationship with wealth at death, on the form of the bequest, and on the different causes to which people bequeath.
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Introduction
Giving to charity at death is an age-old phenomenon, and its importance is likely to grow in the future. For individuals, how one leaves one's wealth is a decision unlike all others. For charities, bequests represent a major source of income: in the UK, legacies make up about a quarter of total donated income for the top 500 fundraising charities (CAF 2004: 22) . Many governments are seeking to encourage charitable giving, and understanding its determinants is of considerable policy relevance.
The aim of this paper is to propose a multi-stage framework for analysing the bequest decision and to examine the evidence about charitable giving at death for Great Britain provided by new data on estates. The novelty of the framework is that it distinguishes between the different steps that lead to a charitable bequest. The potential donor must first have wealth to leave; the donor has to make a will; the will has to include a charitable bequest; the bequest may be conditional rather than absolute; and the bequest may be a specified amount or a residual share. In covering these different steps, it is important that our new data for Britain cover the whole population. This is in contrast to much of the US literature based on estate tax returns which relate only to the upper tail of the distribution of estate size at death: for example the study by Joulfaian (2000) covers only 3 per cent of all decedents. Moreover, in contrast to studies based on US estate tax data, our data make use of the fuller information about donor intentions available from reading the accompanying wills.
Section 2 identifies the different steps and sets out the multi-stage framework. Section 3 describes the estate data. These data are rich in terms of population coverage, but contain limited information about personal characteristics. We therefore focus in Sections 4-6 on three main aspects.
The first is the influence of the size of the estate on the probability of giving. Wealth is likely to affect differently the different steps in making a charitable bequest: for example, the propensity to make a will may be expected to rise with wealth and then level off, whereas the propensity to make a charitable bequest may rise more steadily with wealth. Are these the patterns that prevail? Almost nothing is known in the UK about the relationship between bequeathing to charity and the level of wealth at death. Wedgwood (1929) famously documented charitable bequests in wills published in The Times newspaper, but the nature of his sample raises obvious questions concerning the representativeness of the data. Dawson et al (2003) studied all estates passing through probate in Northern Ireland in 1937, 1967 and  1997, but did not consider the estate values at all. Aldous (2005) considered wealth only 2 briefly, grouping estate values into four categories, but his analysis was based on just 911
estates. Even in the US, where the literature is far more extensive, the restriction of the great bulk of studies to estate tax returns means that knowledge is limited only to the variation in charitable bequests among the large estates that result from just a small proportion of all deaths.
One obvious reason why giving may rise with wealth is the existence, in the UK, of progressive estate taxation. Under the UK Inheritance Tax (IHT), the excess of an estate above the allowance (£300,000 for most of the period in question) is subject to a 40 per cent marginal rate of tax. This means that the "price of giving" (the amount by which the inheritance of other beneficiaries is reduced) falls from 1 to 0.6 when the tax-free threshold is exceeded. (A further tax concession was announced in the 2011 Budget.) The sizeable US literature on individual bequest behaviour (reviewed in Atkinson, Backus and Micklewright, 2009 ) has been particularly concerned with this aspect (e.g. Harriss, 1949 , Boskin, 1976 , and Joulfaian, 2000 . It is for this reason that these studies have limited their attention to the upper part of the wealth distribution, using samples of the estate and gift tax returns carried out by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). As explained in Section 4, the single rate of tax in the UK, together with other considerations, means that we are restricted in what we can say about the effect of tax on UK charitable giving. However, we are able to explore whether the propensity to bequeath shows evidence of a sharp rise in the neighbourhood of the tax-free threshold as predicted by a simple theoretical model that is included in Section 2.
The second focus of our paper is on the form of the charitable bequest, and this is the subject of Section 5. The intention of the donor to make a bequest does not necessarily mean that the charity benefits. Many people have had the experience of learning that they are potential beneficiaries from a will but in the end receive nothing. Charitable bequests may be conditional, rather than absolute. Bequests may take the form of a share of the residual estate after other legacies have been paid, and this residual may be zero. The literature based on simply the estate tax data considers only the actual amount bequeathed that is received by charities. Here we are able to make use of the additional information from the accompanying wills. Do bequests become more certain in value as estate size rises, donors feeling more able to bequeath absolutely and to bequeath specific amounts?
The third focus of the paper is on the destination of the bequest. In Section 6 we examine the pattern of giving by cause, a subject that has received little attention in the existing literature on charitable giving, whether inter-vivos or at death (see, for example, the survey in Andreoni 2006) . Aggregate data from UK charity accounts show which causes 3 benefit most from legacies. For example, cancer charities and animal charities rely heavily on charitable bequests, whereas this is not the case for charities devoted to overseas development (CAF 2004) . Dawson et al (2003) have shown the interesting changes in the pattern of causes over the years 1937, 1967 and 1997 The conclusions and our contribution are summarised at the end of the paper.
A Multi-stage framework for charitable bequeathing
Making a charitable bequest is the result of several distinct steps. First, the person has to die with significant assets. Second, the person has to make a will. A substantial proportion of people in the US and the UK die intestate (without making a will). In the US, 40 per cent of all persons aged 50 or over are estimated not to have made a will (AARP, 2000) . In the UK, it has been estimated that about 60 per cent of the adult population (of all ages) are in this position.
1 Third, the will has to include a charity as a potential beneficiary. The word "potential" is important, since in many cases the charitable bequest is conditional (for example, on the person's partner having pre-deceased the testator). The fourth stage therefore distinguishes between absolute and conditional bequests. Finally, the bequest may take the form of a specific asset or cash sum or it may be a share in the residual estate.
The different stages are summarised in Figure 1 . It is on the (0,1) nature of these decisions that we focus. The first theoretical models of the bequest decision (for example, Yaari, 1964) did not highlight the corner solution where bequests were chosen to be zero, but whether or not we are at a corner is important, as has been shown in the macro-economic literature, where Ricardian equivalence depends on there being "operative inter-generational transfers" (see, Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, Chapter 3 ). In the model proposed here, a person may be at a corner in making no bequests, or in making no charitable bequests. Each of the stages may be influenced by different considerations, as will be the amount of the bequest. The first stage involves the leaving of a significant estate. Many people leave minimal, zero, or negative amounts at death. In the case of Great Britain, in a typical recent year, just under half of all decedents leave property of a size and type to require a "grant of representation". The conditions under which a grant is required are described in the next section. While the conditions are not only based on the size of the estate, it seems reasonable to assume for the purposes of the present analysis that those estates not requiring a grant are not "significant".
Leaving a significant estate reflects both conscious decision-making and unpredictable events (see e.g. Kopczuk, 2007) . There is a very large literature on the former, of which we can make little use, since for the full population of deaths we only observe age (in the majority of cases) and gender. It does however seem likely that the relative importance of the two sets of considerations changes as a person ages, with "deliberate" bequests increasingly replacing "unintended" bequests. Whether or not deliberate bequests increase with age depends on the much-debated life-cycle pattern of wealth-holding. It also depends on the extent to which assets are used up by medical and care home expenses in the period prior to death.
The second stage is that of making a will. Here we can take account of both age (and gender) and the size of estate. For some, this will be a matter of choice: the individual is content with the law of succession that applies to intestate estates, or at least with his or her own perceptions of the law. Here an intestate estate is no different from the case where a will is made and no money is left to charity. But death intestate represents a 'surprise' for other decedents who intended to leave a charitable bequest -the zeros here hide unrealised charitable intent. In practice intestacy may be rare in the wealthy estates covered by the estate tax data in the US but can be expected to be more common in data like those used in this paper that are not limited to high levels of wealth. 2 Since making a will is not typically reversed, there are good reasons to expect the proportion dying intestate to fall with age.
The third stage is that of making a charitable bequest. It seems likely that the propensity to make charitable bequests rises with estate size, and we are interested in how rapidly the propensity rises and whether it approaches an upper limit. As noted in the Introduction, the estate size affects the "price" of giving; with the Inheritance Tax in the UK, 5 the effective price of a charitable bequest relative to a bequest to one's heirs falls from a factor of 1 to 0.6 when the tax-free threshold is exceeded. We should therefore expect a jump at this estate size in the propensity to make charitable bequests.
The fourth stage involves conditionality. We emphasise this stage for two reasons. The first is that it is missed by studies based on estate and gift tax returns. Bequests that are conditional do not appear in data based on these sources where the conditions are not met; and no distinction can be drawn between bequests that were absolute and bequests that were conditional and the conditions were satisfied. Although the data will measure correctly the amount of wealth transferred to charities (for estates above the tax threshold) they may be seen as understating the full extent of the charitable intent of the decedents concerned. The second reason is that the conditions are likely to depend on family circumstances. Almost any model of the bequest decision emphasizes that the willingness to make a charitable bequest is likely to vary with an individual's marital status and dependents, and age: 'the conjecture, of course, is that married and younger persons have more, and more dependent, dependents:
spouses and younger children' (Boskin, 1976: 46 (Havens et al 2006: 545) .
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Conditional on marital status, dependents, age, wealth, and other characteristics, gender is estimated to have little impact in some studies (e.g. Boskin, 1976 and Joulfaian, 2000) while women are found to give less in others (e.g. Joulfaian, 1991) .
The final stage concerns the form of the bequest -whether specific or residual. Where the total amount bequeathed is known with certainty when the decision is taken, then it does not matter whether the charity receives a specified B or (B + X) -X, where X are other bequests. But typically there is considerable uncertainty about the size of the estate, the valuation of assets, and the tax regime.
Theoretical model
The US literature has mostly modelled bequest behaviour as an extension of the standard theory of consumer choice. For instance, Boskin (1976) modelled utility as a 6 function of own consumption, C, other bequests, X, and charitable bequests, B (where we have simplified by omitting lifetime transfers or charitable gifts). Utility, U(C,X,B), is assumed to be maximised subject to a lifetime wealth constraint, such as
where W denotes lifetime wealth and T(X) denotes the estate duty payable, which depends only on X, charitable bequests being assumed fully exempt. It is assumed that the marginal tax rate is a non-decreasing function, thus ensuring that the budget constraint is convex. This model has been elaborated (see for example Watson, 1984 ), but we remain close to the simple formulation in order to highlight the different stages of decision-making that are the main novelty in this paper. where λ is the marginal utility of own consumption (C is assumed strictly positive). It should be noted that where there is a tax-exempt range the first condition does not involve the marginal tax rate. Such a progressive estate tax plays therefore no role in the first-stage decision (given the assumption of a convex budget constraint). It is assumed that there is level of lifetime wealth so low that no one leaves any bequests. Where X=B=0, the value of λ is U c (W,0,0), which is assumed to be a declining function of W. If we further assume that U X (W,0,0) and U B (W,0,0) are increasing functions of W, then as we consider higher values of W, there will come a point where people begin to leave a positive estate. The level of wealth at which this happens, and whether X or B becomes positive first, depends on preferences.
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The simplest case is that of people who have no other heirs and set X=0. Let us assume that there is a single preference parameter, γ, measuring the weight given to charitable bequests relative to own consumption, with a survival function F{γ} (so that a proportion
F{γ} have values in excess of γ). For any given wealth level, W, there will be a proportion F{γ*(W)} of the population who make charitable bequests, where this proportion increases with W. The estate tax has no effect.
Where people have heirs, we have to consider the weight given to charitable bequests, not only relative to own consumption, but also relative to bequests to heirs. There are several possibilities. Those who give more weight to charitable bequests will at first follow a pattern similar to that described above, and then, at a higher W, begin to set X positive. Those who
give more weight to their heirs will, as W rises, first set X positive and then, at a higher W, begin to make positive charitable bequests. From this we can see that the proportion making charitable bequests is an increasing function of lifetime wealth and that the form of this function depends both on the functional form of the utility function U and on the distribution of taste parameters.
The position is further complicated by the progressive estate tax. In the simplest case, as in the UK, there is a single tax rate, t, above the tax threshold, T 0 . Once the estate tax threshold is reached, the first order condition for determining the choice of X involves λ multiplied by (1-t). This means that there is a range of W where the utility-maximising person keeps the value of the bequest to their heirs equal to the threshold, with increases in W being concentrated on C and B. Where B=0, this means that U B /λ is rising faster than it otherwise would, and hence the proportion making charitable bequests is also rising faster. X begins to increase once again when W has reached a level such that U x = λ(1-t) is consistent with X greater than T 0 , and U B /λ reverts to its previous rate of increase. There may therefore be a range around the tax threshold where the proportion making charitable bequests rises more sharply.
The implications for our empirical analysis are that the propensity to leave an estate is an increasing function of W and is not a function of the tax, where there is a positive exemption level. The propensity to make a charitable bequest rises with W, and is influenced by the tax system in the way just described. It has to be remembered however that we do not observe W; we observe W-C.
The model described above is that underlying much empirical work but it has severe limitations. To begin with, the formulation assumes that the utility derived from bequestswhether charitable or to relatives -is of the "pure warm-glow" variety (Andreoni, 1990) . The 8 donor is simply concerned with the sum left. No account is taken, in the case of heirs, of their circumstances. In the case of charitable bequests, no account is taken of the likely benefits from the use of the funds. The theory takes no account of the "public good" motive for giving (Becker, 1974) . We have however to consider such richer motives if we are to examine giving by cause. A second major objection is that the model assumes a degree of foresight that is simply unrealistic in most cases. Wills are often drawn up many years before death and are only occasionally reviewed. As is pointed out by Dawson et al, the reality is "that 10, 20 or 30 years may elapse between a testator making a will and his death, during which time his circumstances have changed beyond recognition. He may no longer own a particular item of property that was specifically bequeathed. He may be significantly better off. Some of the beneficiaries may already be dead" (2003: 35-6) . Their research for Northern Ireland found that over a quarter of wills were made more than 10 years prior to death (2003: 52) .
In view of these limitations, the model provides a starting point, but no more, for our empirical analysis.
Data on estates and charitable bequests in Great Britain
Wedgwood (1929) 
Wealth and charitable giving
The first stage concerns those who left significant wealth at death, defined here as those leaving estates that required a grant of representation and where the estate was of £5,000 or more. We measure the probability of leaving significant wealth by comparing the observations in our sample with the national population data on deaths by age and gender.
There is however the immediate problem that our sample of estates processed in a 12 month 
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The top half of Figure 2 shows estimates separately for Scotland, where we observe age at death for all estates in our sample, and England and Wales, where age at death is missing for a quarter of cases. (We exclude the 3 per cent of deaths occurring below age 40.)
The figures for England and Wales are therefore under-estimated as the denominators used to calculate the probabilities are based on complete population data. It is therefore re-assuring to see a gap between the two series that is roughly constant, suggesting that the missing data result in little bias in the picture obtained for England and Wales of the change in the probability with age.
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The probability of leaving significant wealth rises sharply with age. In England and 
Making a will
Of the 240,912 estates covered by our data, 36,014 (14.9 per cent) are where people died intestate. If the 57 per cent of deaths not covered by our data were all cases of intestacy, then the overall rate of intestacy would be some 63 per cent. This figure for Great Britain is lower than that of 77 per cent given by Dawson et al (2003: 50) for Northern Ireland in 1997, although it is likely to be an over-estimate as some of those decedents not covered by our data will have made wills but no probate was required.
Who are the people who made wills? below to the other columns.) The probability of dying testate, conditional on possessing significant wealth, rises from under 75 per cent in the lowest ranges to 90 per cent plus in the top third of the distribution. The relationship is graphed in Figure 3 . (As with Table 2, we show all stages 2 to 4 of our multi-stage framework.) The vertical line shows the median £146,000. In view of the skew in the distribution, the bottom part of the figure focuses on 13 estates below £500,000. The percentage in our sample making a will rises very sharply from about 50 per cent for estates below £10,000 to nearly 80 per cent for estates at around the level of the bottom quartile of estate size, £60,000, then rises more slowly to 90 per cent for estates of around £200,000 -a level not far short of the top quartile. This rise -although not necessarily its pattern -is scarcely surprising. What is remarkable is that some people die leaving estates of over £1 million without making a will. The figure of 3.3 per cent may be compared with that of 4.3 per cent among deaths resulting in estate tax returns in the US in 2007 when the threshold for filing was $2m.
11 Table 2 intestate, reflecting in part the 'surprise' that death may represent at that age. By age 85-90, increased age-specific mortality has concentrated minds and only 10 per cent of decedents are intestate. The rise in testacy with age and the fact that men on average die at a younger age (see Table 1 ) helps explain why the overall testacy rate is lower for men (82.0 per cent) than for women (87.8 per cent). But Figure 4 shows there are still gender differences within age groups. (The graphs are restricted to estates in England and Wales for which age at death is recorded.) For those aged 55 to 64, the percentage dying intestate is 10 percentage points higher for men. We cannot control for marital status but with this proviso it does appear that men dying at below average ages are less likely to have made a will than women of the same age.
Figure 4 near here
Making a charitable bequest
Having made a will, the next step is to whether to include a charitable bequest.
Overall, 16 per cent of testate estates did so. Given the testacy rate of 85 per cent and our calculation that the data cover some 43 per cent of all deaths, this implies that 6 per cent of deaths in Britain in 2007 resulted in a charitable bequest. This compares well with the 11 See footnote 2.
estimate of about 5 per cent from Radcliffe (2002) . (It should be borne in mind that some estates that do not pass through probate also contain bequests to charities.)
How does the propensity to bequeath to charity vary with the size of the estate? Table   2 (column 4) shows that there is indeed substantial variation. For the smallest estates, 1 in 10 make a charitable bequest; for those over £1 million it is more than 4 in 10. The rise is not smooth. The propensity to bequeath to charity rises little through the bottom half of the distribution, something seen most clearly in the lower part of Figure 3 . The rise is then particularly noticeable around the IHT threshold, £300,000 for most of the estates in our sample. For the range from £250,000 to £299,999, the percentage is 17 per cent; by the time we reach £500,000 to £999,999, the percentage has virtually doubled. We return to this below.
As may be seen from Figure 3 , the increase in the proportion continues above £1 million: a half of all testate estates of £3m or more contain charitable bequests. 12 The £1m level is similar in US dollar terms to the threshold for estate tax filing in the US in 2004-5. Were we to be limited to data with that minimum value for estate size we would miss most of the variation in the propensity to bequeath to charity. The percentages of large estates containing a charitable bequest in our data may be compared with those in the US recorded in the IRS data. In 2004, 17 per cent of estates with less than $2.0 million in gross value contained a charitable bequest, rising to 44 per cent in estates with $20 million or more (Raub 2008: 126) .
The US figures appear lower than those for Britain but we should note that they refer only to bequests that were realized.
It is a common belief that women are more likely to give to charity than men and this appears to be the case for inter-vivos giving in the UK, with women about 1.2-1.3 times more likely to report giving when asked about donations in the previous month (Micklewright and Schnepf 2009) . Our data show this sort of differential is repeated in giving at death: the proportion of testate estates containing charitable bequests is 14 per cent for men compared with 18 per cent for women. The propensity to bequeath is higher for women within all but the youngest age group -see the middle panel of Figure 4 . It is indeed the case that a smaller proportion of men make bequests than women. It should be noted that our figures includes both absolute and potential conditional bequests; we are not restricting attention only to bequests that were realised. So the gender differential is not attributable to men being more likely to have a surviving spouse (and hence for charitable bequests not to be activated). It is notable that the percentages bequeathing do not change much with age. 12 The two standard error confidence intervals for the percentages with a charitable bequest in the top two ranges of estate size are about +/-4 points.
Inheritance Tax
As shown in the model in Section 2, we can expect a jump in the proportion of decedents making a charitable bequest when the taxable estate reaches the Inheritance Tax (IHT) threshold, which was £300,000 for most of the period covered by the deaths in our sample (see Section 3). As we have seen, for the range from £250,000 to £299,999, the percentage is 17 per cent; by the time we reach £500,000 to £999,999, the percentage has virtually doubled. At the same time, we need to allow for the effect of increasing wealth on the propensity -the doubling over this range of estate size is unlikely to have been due to any price effect alone. Moreover, it is also unlikely that such a change will appear as a jump in the data; instead we expect the shift in the propensity to take place over a range of wealth for two reasons.
First, the point at which IHT applies may in fact be well above the value of the IHT threshold. Assets left to a surviving spouse or civil partner are free of tax by law, and do not use up the tax-free allowance. A further complication is that from November 2007 -within the period covered by our data -the executors of an estate of a widow or widower could claim any IHT allowance that had not been used by the former spouse as a result of having left assets to their surviving partner. The unused allowance is granted at the current rate, effectively doubling the value of the tax-free threshold of an estate for many widows and widowers. Even before this change in the law, many estates larger than £300,000 in value were free of tax. HMRC figures for persons dying in 2005-6 show that less than two-thirds of estates above this size were subject to any IHT (although this is the figure after taking into account the reduction in tax liability due to any charitable bequests) (IHT statistics, Table   12 .3). 13 In some cases tax will be due even if the estate is below the normal threshold: IHT takes account of gifts made in the 7 years before death. We do not observe marital status at death, the bequests made to a surviving partner, the bequests made by a former partner, or any gifts in the years before death -all information needed to calculate the tax liability for an estate.
The second consideration is that charitable bequests are determined in many cases at some time before death, as we have discussed earlier. The testator has therefore to form a view about the likely value of the threshold and tax rates in the future, but this may change substantially -as illustrated by the recent dramatic swings in estate tax threshold in the US: In Figure 5 we probe more carefully the change in the propensity to bequeath to charity around the standard IHT threshold of £300,000, focusing on testate estates of size £200,000 to £399,999 (of which there are 57,496 in our data). We use non-parametric regression to allow the shape of the relationship between estate size and the bequest propensity to be traced out in a flexible way. The data suggest an increase in the change in the propensity in the interval £275,000 to £325,000. We then estimate a parametric model (probit regression) for the probability of a charitable bequest as a piecewise linear function of estate size with knots at £275,000 and £300,000, constraining the parameter estimates for estate size below and above these levels to be the same. 14 The estimates are reported in the box in the diagram. We reject at the 5 per cent level (t=2.1) the null hypothesis that the parameter in the interval £275,000 to £325,000 is the same as that for larger or smaller estate sizes. Assume now that this steepening in the relationship is entirely due to the reduction in price produced by the tax. The predicted probability of a bequest at £325,000 is 2.1 percentage points higher than it would be in the absence of the reduction in price, implying an elasticity of the propensity to bequeath of only 0.27.
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Figure 5 near here
The form of the charitable bequest
For the charity to be certain of receiving a bequest it has to be absolute (and the estate has to have sufficient assets). Of all those testators leaving a charitable bequest, 73 per cent left an absolute bequest (they may also have left conditional bequests). This percentage is around 60 per cent for smaller estates but then rises to around 85 per cent for estates of over £1m -see Table 2 and Figure 3. (The fall for estates of over £3m is not statistically significant.) Greater wealth at death is associated with more absolute bequests. It is this rise in absolute bequeathing that drives the overall increase in the propensity to bequeath to charity with estate size, as shown in the top half of Figure 6 , which distinguishes between the two forms of bequest. (Since estates may contain both forms, the sum of the two estimates at any level of estate size exceeds the figure for the percentage of estates containing either form.) The percentage of charitable testators leaving an absolute bequest also rises with age -see Figure   4 . It is not perhaps surprising that men are less likely, for reasons discussed, to make an absolute bequest: 64 per cent, compared with 78 per cent. The gap varies with age, opening up above the age of 65 and remaining substantial until the late 90s. Figure 6 here
The other choice testators must make over the form of a bequest is whether to leave a specific amount (or item) to charity -a 'pecuniary' bequest -or a residuary share of the estate. The importance of this distinction has been brought out by Dawson et al: "the distinction between residuary gifts and all other types of gift is very important. Subject to a contrary intention in the will, the debts owing … together with the expenses of administration will firstly be borne by the residue, then out of pecuniary legacies and only as a last resort out of legacies of specific assets. … As a result the net residuary estate may be significantly less valuable … On the other hand, any unexpected increases in the value of the residue could be to the advantage of the residuary beneficiaries " (2003: 165) . For the charities that are the potential recipients, residual bequests involve greater uncertainty. In particular, they are more vulnerable to falls in asset prices. But for the testator, bequeathing in this form provides insurance against uncertainty. The bottom half of Figure 6 reflects the decline in need for this insurance as estate size rises: the propensity to bequeath a specific sum to charity (or in a few cases a specific item) rises more quickly than the propensity to leave a residuary share (or shares).
Taking the two dimensions of the form of bequest together -absolute vs. conditional and pecuniary vs. residuary -the nature of bequeathing changes a great deal across the distribution of estate size. The proportion of all bequests that are both absolute and pecuniary rises from around 30 per cent in estates of £10,000 to £59,000 to between 55 and 60 per cent in estates of over £1m (Atkinson, Backus and Micklewright, 2009, Table 5) . At the same time, the bequests that are both conditional and residuary fall from about 30-35 per cent of the total to 10-13 per cent.
As estate size rises, testators are therefore more certain in their form of bequeathing.
This increase in certainty would appear only to benefit charities, but we should note that we have not been able to analyse the amounts concerned. An uncertain residuary share of a large estate may yield a greater expected sum for a charity than a certain pecuniary bequest. For the subset of pecuniary bequests for which we have information on their value, the median amount bequeathed is only £1,000 (Atkinson, Backus and Micklewright, 2009 , Table A1 ).
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As we noted earlier, other sources indicate that the average residuary bequest to charity is indeed much larger than the average pecuniary bequest.
Charitable bequests by cause
Of particular interest to both government policy-makers and charities is the distribution of giving by cause. If we return to the theoretical model of Section 2, we can see that the implications depend on the source of the utility derived from bequests. Where the utility is of the "warm-glow" variety, and the donor is simply concerned with the sum left, this is quite consistent with giving to a single cause, although it provides little guidance as to the choice of cause, since no account is taken of the likely benefits from the use of the funds. In contrast, the "public good" motive for giving may suggest a strategy of diversification. Where decisions may be made many years in advance, there is an evident risk that a particular cause may become redundant or its activities may have been taken over by government. Dawson et al (2003: 192) note that, over time, in Northern Ireland, the establishment of the National Health Service led to a switch from supporting core health services to giving to charities concerned with prevention.
The empirical literature on charitable bequests by cause is sparse. As was noted by Feldstein (1976: 102) , the fourfold categorization of bequests by recipient used in the early IRS studies left the large majority in the residual category. Attention has however been drawn to the specialization of giving. In the study by Joulfaian (1991) , of the 13,492 estates in the sample, 2,554 made charitable bequests. Of these, over half (1,307) reported only 1 category of recipient (out of 6). He describes this concentration as 'puzzling'. Some studies have looked at the number of causes to which bequests are made. The amount bequeathed to each cause has also been analyzed and both Boskin (1976) and Barthold and Plotnick (1984) found bequeathing to religious causes to be much less wealth elastic. The wealthy leave bequests to more charitable causes but do they bequeath to different causes? Or do they just add on further causes while still leaving bequests to those favoured by persons with only modest estates? For each of the 20 causes identified in our data, Table 3 shows the percentage of all charitable estates that contain at least one bequest to the cause together with the percentages in large estates and in small estates, where large and small are defined as £500,000 or more and less than £40,000 respectively. (Together, the large and small estates account for 1 in 5 of all charitable estates.) We have sorted the causes on the basis of the figures in column (5), which show the percentage of large estates containing a bequest to the cause in question divided by the percentage of small estates with a bequest. to identify the charitable purpose, for example a bequest to a charitable trust named after the decedent where there is no indication as to the cause that the charity serves. In this way, the wealthy may be able to bequeath to charity but have considerable influence over the use of the assets bequeathed through appointment of chosen trustees prior to the date of death. The cause with the biggest ratio between large and small estates is education. Given that a bequest to charity is made, large estates are over 4½ times more likely than small estates to contain a bequest to this cause. And taking into account all testate estates, including those with no charitable bequests, large estates are about 15 times more likely to have a bequest to education than small estates, whereas they are only about 3½ times more likely to contain a bequest to an animal charity. 
Conclusions
Our main findings may be summarised as follows:
 To understand giving to charitable causes, it is necessary to consider a multi-stage process: leaving significant wealth at death, making a will, including a charitable bequest, the conditions under which a bequest materialises, and the form in which it is made;
 The different stages in the decision process are influenced differently by the variables that we have considered: age, gender, and the variable on which we have focused in particular, estate size;
 The proportion of decedents leaving significant wealth rises steadily with age at death; from age 65 to 90, it is higher for women;
 The percentage making a will rises with age, is higher for women, and at first rises sharply with estate size -although it is still only 90 per cent for estates of around £200,000, a level not far short of the top quartile of the distribution of wealth at death;  Overall, 16 per cent of those making a will included a charitable bequest; the percentage rises substantially with estate size -from 10 per cent for the smallest estates in our data to 50 per cent for the largest of over £3m in size; there is some suggestion of a sharper increase around the Inheritance Tax (IHT) threshold, consistent with a price elasticity of the propensity to bequeath of about 0.27;  Higher wealth at death is associated with testators being more likely to leave an absolute bequest, free of conditions, and more likely to leave a bequest of a specific amount to charity, as opposed to a bequest of a residual share of the estate. (Overall, of those making a charitable bequest, 73 per cent left at least one bequest that was absolute.) It is the rise in absolute bequeathing that accounts for the rise in the bequest propensity with estate size;
 The larger estates typically add further causes; while large charitable estates are only a little more likely to contain bequest to some of the most popular causes (and no more likely for animal charities), other causes -most notably education -are much more likely to be favoured by the wealthy. Notes: Rows are ordered by the values in the last column in ascending order. There are 3,947 charitable estates of less than £40,000 and 5,424 of more than £500,000. In total, 33,482 estates contained a charitable bequest. The first number in column (2) indicates that among all estates that contain a charitable bequest, 24.9% include at least one bequest to a charity working for animals. Table 6 .4 (together with personal communication with the Office to provide a breakdown for the number of deaths at age 85+).
29
Figure 3. Testacy, bequeathing to charity conditional on testacy, and absolute bequeathing conditional on charitable bequeathing, by estate size a) £5,000 to £5 million b) £5,000 to £500,000 30 Notes: percentages are plotted against the median estate size in each of the ranges shown in Table 2 . The dashed vertical line is at the overall median estate size. Note: percentages are plotted against the median estate size in each of the ranges shown in Table 2 .
